Damning

Her phone was, but no one called, nor did she call. Even when previously told a disaster was imminent. Damning!

We know that Ms Nixon’s phone did not ring between 1800 and 2100, the worst period of the fires a consequence of further investigation by counsel assisting, it appears on the balance of probabilities Ms Nixon’s phone was on. The fact that there were no phone calls received or made is testament, we say, to the manner in which this state’s emergency response planning was being carried out.

It was put to Ms Nixon that this lack of leadership was embarrassing. It is submitted she didn’t really need to provide an answer, but she did. She denied it was embarrassing, said it was because she had “good people doing it for me”; but not even that delegation had been properly carried out.

Someone else was assumed to be in charge

So for a period of time, which I will come to,Ms Nixon was not present, Mr Fontana was not present and Mr Walshe was not present. So the substantive hierarchy in relation to this state’s emergency response plan were not present at the IECC, the SERCC or the POC to coordinate the state’s emergency response plan.

…

She indicated that at the time she left that briefing with the fire chiefs that the State of Victoria, on what she had been told, was facing a disaster. Soon after that meeting Ms Nixon left the IECC and went home. Ms Nixon’s justification for leaving was that she had an understanding that Mr Fontana was in place and Mr Walshe would be arriving in the not too distant future. It is unclear how she got that understanding. Despite her earlier evidence, the state coordinator of Displan had not spoken with her delegated deputy, Mr Walshe, at all on 7 February prior to her leaving the IECC at 1800.

No contact was made, as indicated, between chief and deputy. Mr Walshe was not on duty. At 1800 there were no arrangements for him to go on duty. He in fact believed Ms Nixon was on duty.

So everyone assumed that someone else was in charge; even in the face of a disaster.

“How many fire 11 chiefs does it take to move an aircrane?”

Too many.

“We just note it because it is striking that in the clamour by a number of witnesses to take personal credit for this single decision, no-one checked that in fact it was another aerial resource that dealt with the fire and the one they had so ordered to attend, apparently each of them separately, in fact went to Narre Warren.”

Curious that they each take try to take credit for this.

Busy: doing what?

It’s been missed by the media, but this summation by Rachel Doyle (Counsel Assisting) is an apt description how the IECC did not work:

“‘Busy: doing what?’ because as we identify in this section there were two chief fire officers, a state coordinator from the CFA, the DSE chief officer contact, a CFA state duty officer, a DSE state duty officer and a CFA member known as “strategic planning”, or Mr Warrington, and yet between them these seven gentlemen we say were responsible for a mere eight decisions which we have set out from paragraph 7.8 onwards. We say two of those decisions were decisions effectively to do nothing.”

I thought Nixon was on duty?

I thought Nixon was on: deputy

“I had understood she was on duty from shortly before 1pm,” he said in a witness statement. “It is my belief that we did discuss what we would do on the weekend, because I did tell [an assistant commissioner] that I would be on standby at home on the Saturday.” This appears to contradict Ms Nixon, who initially said in a statement to the commission that she “prepared for an active day”, but later said she was not rostered on.

But she wasn’t. She spent parts of 7th having a haircut, being interviewed by a biographer and going out to dinner.

Mr Walshe said he did not know why Ms Nixon had told the commission that she felt able to leave emergency headquarters at 6pm partly because she knew Mr Walshe was coming in about 7pm.

…

He had previously told the commission that he left home about 7pm to go to police headquarters. He admitted yesterday that this was closer to 8pm because he was delayed making personal phone calls.

Let’s get this straight. Christine Nixon left the IECC at 6pm to get ready for dinner at 7pm. She assumed that her deputy would be on at 7pm, but he did not arrive until 8pm!

No one was in direct control for two hours! They each thought the other was doing that role!

Not only that, both people thought it more important to attend to personal matters on the day, even with the knowledge of the disaster unfolding before them!

Nixon feeding frenzy leaves bitter aftertaste

Great analysis from Jane Cowan on Christine Nixon’s evidence to the commission.

This comment from a commenter called Justin (12 Apr 2010 8:02:29pm) is worth noting:

Gary & Gadget, so its appalling is it? Let me just ask one question - were you in any of the fire affected towns on Feb 7, suddenly facing an inferno, trying to implement a defend plan for which no warnings had been received via internet or radio?

A few things that you both need to understand:

(1) Christine Nixon was not just the Police Commissioner. Under the Emergency Management Act, she had the full control over ALL, thats right ALL emergency services. She left her post.

(2) Russell Rees should no longer be the head of the CFA. His incompetence has been adequately laid to bare during the hearings - failing to source line scans, losing or not seeing predictive mapping, acknowledging during the Commission that he did not know where the fires were in my region (Strathewen, St Andrews), not ensuring that messages were actually posted to the ABC and online;

(3) Bob Cameron, the Emergency Services Minister. He was not even available that day. He was in the country, as was Mr Brumby. He was at his family property in Harcourt.

So, at 6p.m, at the height of the disaster we had the three people capable of declaring a state of emergency, in absentia. Nixon, Cameron and Brumby. They all knew of the dangers in the lead up to that day. They were all over the media. If you want this point reinforced, get a copy of the ABC documentary put together after the fires called “After The Firestorm.” Rees himself talks of the scale of the impending disaster at 3pm and the likely loss of life.

Now, to Ms Nixons “I had to eat.” The first meal I had after Feb 7th was at 4.30am on Sunday 8th. I then had 2 hours sleep before I got back to work on properties next to mine. Not as a CFA member, but as a mere landowner. Thats what we do, we band together. We get things done. We dont abandon. Groups of people got together with their own equipment - excavators, chainsaws, pumps, hoses, slip on units etc - and opened up roads when official requests were ignored. A police friend of mine in Kinglake, who was party to saving a group of approx 40 people in Pheasant Creek didnt eat, sleep or see his family for three days. He didnt abandon his post.

Gary and Gadget, you will perhaps never fully understand what it is to be let done by the authorities on such a grand scale. The disaster plans so practised by the head honchos, failed. And failed catastrophically. The potential scale of this disaster was known at about 1.30pm that day when the line scan was produced - predicting that the fire could reach the Dandenongs. The scale of the disaster, if the wind change had not eventuated two hours earlier than expected, would have seen the deaths of manay many more people than it did.

 173. Thats what Nixon, Rees & Cameron need to remember at each ribbon cutting ceremony and fake smile for the cameras.

Bushfires commission to examine mass evacuations

Bushfires commission to examine mass evacuations:

“He said the commission would scrutinise the websites of fire-fighting organisations and assess ‘the ability to track fires at all’. Warnings needed to be accurate and timely, he said. ‘Underpinning such warnings is the ability for agencies to rapidly analyse on-the-ground intelligence, to monitor risks as they emerge and develop, predict future impacts and point to the best course of action.’”

This is very interesting. I have some concerns with the CFA’s web site when it comes to warnings and timely information.

(Via The Age.)